In Search of Coverage in Cyberspace: Why the Commercial General Liability Policy Fails to Insure Lost or Corrupted Computer Data by Yost, Paula M. et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4 Article 9
2001
In Search of Coverage in Cyberspace: Why the
Commercial General Liability Policy Fails to Insure




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paula M. Yost, et al., In Search of Coverage in Cyberspace: Why the Commercial General Liability Policy Fails to Insure Lost or Corrupted
Computer Data, 54 SMU L. Rev. 2055 (2001)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol54/iss4/9
IN SEARCH OF COVERAGE IN
CYBERSPACE: WHY THE COMMERCIAL
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY FAILS TO





ONG before the "Internet" was invented, or the world had ever
heard of cyberspace, computer viruses, hackers and e-mail, a
group charged with guiding insurers in the buying and selling of
risk added a simple new word to the standard form liability insurance
policy that would prove to be prophetic almost forty years later.1 In de-
fining "property damage" for the first time, it inserted the word "tangi-
ble" to make it clear that the standard liability policy covered only
damage to physical property-in other words, property that is perceptible
to the senses, and thus capable of being touched, felt and seen. With this
definition (" 'property damage' means injury to or destruction of tangible
property"),2 there would be no argument that the commercial general
* Paul Glad, William Barker and Paula Yost are partners in the law firm of Sonnen-
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Laws Annotated. Mr. Barker, who practices in the firm's Chicago office, received his law
degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He has published nearly 100 articles
on matters related to insurance and is Editorial Board Director and Senior Contributing
Editor of Insurance Litigation Reporter. Ms. Yost, who practices in San Francisco, gradu-
ated from the University of Texas School of Law at Austin. She is a co-author of E-Busi-
ness and Insurance: A Legal Guide To Transacting Insurance and Other Business on the
Internet.
1. The organization that made these changes was the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters ("NBCU"). The functions of this entity were later assumed by the Insurance
Services Office, Inc., or ISO, which was founded in 1971 with the merger of 11 insurance
rating bureaus (including the NBCU). ISO is a nationwide, for-profit association consist-
ing of more than 1,400 property and casualty insurers, and like its predecessor, drafts stan-
dard forms for its member companies, collects loss data, estimates risks and provides
pricing relevant to the standardized forms it disseminates. See In re Ins. Antitrust Litig.,
938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co.,
672 F. Supp. 939, 940 n.6 (E.D. La. 1987).
2. Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 18
CPCU ANALS 197, 200 (Fall 1965). The revisions were adopted and circulated in 1965, and
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liability policy, or CGL as it is commonly known, 3 was designed to insure
the intangible, ephemeral or purely economic. Until now.
We now live in a virtual world. The electronic collection, maintenance
and storage of data is both essential and routine, and data itself is an
extremely valuable business asset whose loss or corruption can lead to
both lost profits and liability to others. Not surprisingly, attorneys for
policyholders are arguing that computerized "data" that is lost or tainted
falls within the meaning of "property damage" under the standard CGL
form. The word "tangible," however, added to the policy in 1965, poses a
formidable barrier to that effort. In the face of dictionaries defining "tan-
gible" as that which is "capable of being touched ' 4 and "tangible prop-
erty" as property "having physical substance apparent to the senses," 5 it
is obviously difficult to argue that data is "tangible" under an insurance
contract. To date, courts have generally honored the plain meaning of
the word "tangible" in their interpretation of insurance contracts, finding
that project designs,6 movies or film presentations, 7 and telephone num-
bers8 are not "tangible" for purposes of coverage. Thus, unless courts are
willing to rewrite the terms of the contracts between insurer and insured,
they should find no coverage under standard CGL policies for liability
flowing from the loss or corruption of data in cyberspace. 9
There are ominous signs that some courts may be willing to depart
from the age-old principles governing contractual interpretation-
namely, that the plain meanings of words control-to find that data is
"tangible" or that its loss or damage can be "physical." In a decision that
made headlines last year,' 0 a federal district court held that computer
data lost during a power outage constituted "direct physical loss or dam-
they became effective in February 1966. After adding the word "tangible" to the definition
in 1965, ISO thereafter twice amended the definition, in 1973 and again in 1986, to clarify
the scope of "property damage" coverage. See infra note 45. The word "tangible," how-
ever, has remained a constant.
3. In 1965, "CGL" stood for Comprehensive General Liability Policy. To make it
clear that the standard CGL was not an all-risk policy but one designed to cover certain
specified risks, the title was changed in 1986 to Commercial General Liability Policy.
4. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE, 2337 (Merriam Webster, Inc. 1993).
5. Id.
6. Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808 (3d Cir. 1994).
7. Schaefer/Karpf Prod. v. CNA Ins. Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423 (1998); Gulf Ins. Co. v.
L.A. Effects Group, Inc., 827 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
8. Peoples Tel. Co., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36 F. Supp.2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
9. "Cyberspace" was first coined by William Gibson, in his popular science fiction
novel Neuromancer. The word was used "to describe the real and cultural dynamics of
people and machines working within the confines of computer-based networks." Alexan-
der C. Gavis, The Offering and Distribution of Securities in Cyberspace: A Review of Regu-
latory and Industry Initiatives, 52 Bus. LAW. 317, 319 n.6 (1996) (quoting G. BURGESS
ALLISON, THE LAWYERS GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 331 (1995)).
10. See Wim Mostert, Physical Damage Finds Broader Meaning, Bus. DAY, June 22,
2000, available at 2000 WL 20229763; Arizona Judge Finds 'Physical Damage' Applies To
Loss of Data Functionality, MEALEY'S YEAR 2000 REP. 16 (June 2000); John Leming, E-
Coverage Alert: Ingram Micro Court Decision Sets New Precedent, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1,
2000, available at 2000 WL 8276993; see also John P. Mello Jr., Virtually Physical, CFO,
Sept. 22, 2000 ("Shock waives rippled through the insurance industry this summer when a
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age from any cause" under an insurance policy. While American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., I involved coverage for losses under
a first-party policy insuring business interruption (as opposed to coverage
for liability under a CGL), the case is significant. The court acknowl-
edged that it found coverage because the claim arose "[a]t a time when
computer technology dominates our professional as well as personal
lives."' 12 To reach this result, the court simply read the word "physical"
out of the contract, looking far afield to various federal and state statutes
dealing with liability for "computer damage." 13 The decision is flawed in
both reasoning and result, but it provides a foreboding example of how
far a court will go to find coverage where none exists.
The focus of this article is the non-existence of insurance coverage for
lost or corrupted data under the "traditional" or standard CGL. It shows
that lost or corrupted data cannot constitute "property damage," as de-
fined by such policies, for the simple reason that data is not "tangible."
And it explains that courts seeking guidance on this issue should disre-
gard Ingram Micro as an anomaly supported by neither the plain meaning
of the policy nor existing precedent.
The judiciary may be tempted to shift cyber-losses onto insurers who
never accepted such risks and never received a premium for them, partic-
ularly where policyholders face catastrophic financial losses and/or liabil-
ity caused by lost or corrupted data. Yet, the courts, bound by settled
rules of contractual interpretation, should refrain from such intellectual
adventures unless specific policy language, not present in the standard
form policies, allows for such expansive coverage. The rules governing
the interpretation of insurance contracts are bedrock: When the terms of
an insurance contract are plain and explicit, courts should never indulge
in a forced construction to cast liability upon an insurer that it never
assumed.
Insurance is not intended to solve all the problems of the world. Insur-
ance contracts are not "living and breathing" documents, like constitu-
tions, whose provisions might be said to evolve with changing times and
the needs of policyholders or society. Rather, an insurance policy is a
contract in which the parties have allocated risk, limiting and defining
their respective obligations. Like any contract, it derives its force from
the consent of the parties when it was entered. It is a product whose
reach is limited by its terms. There may be coverage gaps, and if there
are, policyholders are free to fill them, or not, as they deem necessary.
Indeed, the insurance industry already offers a variety of products specifi-
cally designed to cover financial losses or liability flowing from lost or
U.S. District Court ruled that property policies covering physical damage must also honor
claims stemming from the loss of computer data.").
11. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. Apr.
18, 2000).




tainted data. 14 But, the insurance industry's failure to keep pace with a
technological revolution that gave rise to unexpected "cyber-risks" virtu-
ally overnight 15 provides no basis to hoist upon insurers obligations they
never assumed. Courts should decline the inevitable invitations to disre-
gard the language of insurance contracts in an effort to find coverage
where none exists and fulfill "expectations" never contemplated.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF RISK IN A WIRED WORLD
In just a few years, the Internet dramatically changed the world. While
the first computer was invented 60 years ago, 16 and computers came into
14. Some insurers have responded to the new cyber-risks by issuing policies specifi-
cally targeted to cover losses or liability caused by data eaten or corrupted by computer
viruses or bugs. See, e.g., Mary Christine Convey, Safeco Looks to Cover "Love Bug"
Losses, NAT'L UNDERWRITERS PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., June 26,
2000 at 10, available at 2000 WL 10593519 (detailing available first-party coverages); Anne
Gonzales, Hackers and Viruses Spur Interest in Internet Insurance, Bus. J., 22, June 16,
2000, at 22, available at 2000 WL 16159513 (noting "cyber insurance policies" for third
party liability "have been around for a couple of years"); Greg Nelson, Exposed on the Net:
A Comparison of Internet Business Exposures with Standard Business Policies 53, CPCU
JOURNAL, 106-21 (Summer 2000) (identifying and outlining new policies directed to cover-
ing Internet-related risks); Robert L. Carter, Jr. & Donald 0. Johnson, Keep on Top of
Insurance Coverage to Help Combat Computer Viruses, 15 CORP. COUNS. 3, at 1 (Aug.
2000) (noting that many policies contain language that expressly insures the "destruction,
distortion or corruption of any computer data, coding, program, or software except as
hereinafter excluded.").
15. See Emily Canelo, Getting Wired: Internet Risks, 629 PLI/LIT 569, 571 (2000) (stat-
ing that "[n]ew loss exposures that can impact insurers seem to appear overnight," and
"[t]he birth of the World Wide Web is revolutionizing communication and commerce at
such breakneck speeds that existing business protocols are becoming antiquated."). Al-
though a number of insurers have provided a variety of new products (see supra note 14),
the industry has been criticized for moving too slowly. Some in the industry say this can be
attributed to a lack of demand due to a failure by risk managers to appreciate the need for
targeted coverage as well as the difficulty of underwriting an area with virtually no claims
history and a risk that "changes every day." Barbara Bowers, Getting a Grasp on E-Com-
merce Risks, Best's Review, p. 57, Mar. 2001. This unpredictability is critical to under-
standing the difficulty of writing cyber-coverage. To insure a particular type of exposure,
an insurer must be able to establish premiums that will pay losses and expenses and also
provide a reasonable profit. To accomplish this end, the insurer must estimate the ex-
pected losses during the next policy period for each group to be charged a particular rate.
To satisfy this criterion, the underlying conditions must remain the same during the next
policy period as in the past, or the insurer must be able to predict the change in the under-
lying conditions. Thus, the ability to appropriately price a policy (enabling the insurer to
pay losses on that policy)" favors an exposure where changes occur slowly and in predict-
able ways or not at all." C. Arthur Williams, Jr., et al., Principles of Risk Management and
Insurance, 2d ed. p. 237 CPCU vol. 1 (Amer. Inst. For Prop. and Liability Underwriters
(1981).
16. There exists a heated debate as to who should be credited with inventing the first
"computer," and when that actually occurred. Maurice Wilkes, a professor, invented ED-
SAC, which has been called "the world's first modern, working stored-program computer,"
in May 1949. John W. Machly and Presper Eckert, professors at University of Penn-
sylvania, built the Electronic Numerial Integrator and Computer ("ENIAC"), which first
became operational in 1946, as a weapon for war, and it has been called the "first general-
purpose, electronic computer." Mathematician John von Neumann (who worked on the
Manhattan Project) worked with Machly and Eckert on ENIAC, contributed ideas for EN-
IAC's successor, EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable Calculator) and wrote a widely
distributed paper on those ideas. Iowa State University professor John Atanasoff invented
the first digital calculating machine in early 1941. Howard Aiken built an electromechani-
2058 [Vol. 54
COVERAGE IN CYBERSPACE
common use in the workplace in the 1980s, it was not until the Internet
first came "on line" for use by the general public, in the mid 1990s, 17 that
computers would become so deeply integrated into the way people in the
developed world work, live and play. Capable of collapsing both time
and distance at minimal cost, the Internet is now the preferred method of
communication, surpassing even the telephone in workplace usage (as of
1998, approximately 50 million people used "e-mail" in the United States,
sending an estimated 500 million messages per day-or 23.5 quadrillion
messages in that year alone)' 8 ; it is the preeminent research tool and
source of information (a role that is facilitated with its search engines,
"metatags," and "hyperlinks"), 19 soon to render the Yellow Pages and en-
cyclopedia obsolete; and, it is fast becoming the "place" to do business,
already having spawned a virtual gold-rush as companies, new and old,
rushed to gain a presence in cyberspace with beguiling domain names and
eye-catching web pages.
More than 259 million people use the global computer network to-
day.20 If it is "the information superhighway," as world leaders have
dubbed it,2 1 then commerce is the fuel for its traffic. Businesses have
flocked to the World Wide Web 22 to transact with both businesses
cal calculator for I.B.M. in the early 1940s. British Maurice Colossus created Colossus,
which was comparable to ENIAC and which was operational in 1943. German Konrad Zus
is credited with creating the first working program-controlled digital computer called the
Z3 in 1943. Sir Freddy Williams and Professor Tom Kilburn built the SSEM (small-scale
electronic machine), which first ran in 1948, to which all modern computers assertedly
"come back." See Christopher Lehmann-Harupt, Creating a Giant Brain, And Not Getting
Credit, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, June 14, 1999, at 7, available at 1999 WL 30528070; Sharon
Smith, Clash of the Titans, COMPUTER WKLY. Mar. 7, 1996, at 30, available at 1996 WL
9061809.
17. John Engstrom, Gore Backs More Competition on the Road to Superhighway, SE-
ATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 12, 1994, at Al, available at 1994 WL 6141283 (noting
that Clinton administration has "kick-started" Internet with legislation allowing general
public access to Internet); Denise Pelissier, The Internet: Journey Into Cyberspace,
UNESCO COURIER, Feb. 1, 1995, at 19, available at 1995 WL 12597287 (noting that "peo-
ple all over the world are taking their first steps on the information superhighway by join-
ing the Internet.").
18. David E. Kalish, Employers' E-Mail Monitoring Surges, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 5,
1999, at El (citing Forrester Research Inc. estimates for 1994, 1998 & 2002).
19. The Internet is also noteworthy for its creation of an entirely new lexicon, consist-
ing of new words and acronyms (e.g., "metatags", "B2Bs") and old words with new
prefixes (e.g., "e-" and "cyber-").) A "metatag" is a hidden code on a Web page; invisible
to Internet users, the words within metatags can be found by search engines. A "hyper-
link" provides the ability to move from one's website directly to that of another by clicking
on a logo or icon.
20. The World's Online Population, available at http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big-pic-
ture/geographics/article/1,1323,5911_151151,00 (last modified July 28, 2000).
21. Barry McCall, Business This Year 2, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at 63, availa-
ble at 1997 WL 16329590 (crediting Al Gore with coining phrase "information superhigh-
way"); Noor Amal, Getting Into the 12 Bandwagon, THE NEW STRAIGHTS TIMES, Nov. 3,
1997, at 34, available at 1997 WL 15072579 (same).
22. The World Wide Web is not a database of information, but is a reference to a
service that uses a basic type of language to browse Internet sites. It is a "web" of many
sites linked together that users can access by clicking on hyperlinks. J. Look, The Virtual
Wild, Wild West (WWW): Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace-Trademarks, Service
Marks, Copyrights and Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 49, 51 n.7
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("B2Bs") and consumers ("B2Cs"), and revenues from the deals consum-
mated there are exploding-exponentially so. It is predicted that e-com-
merce revenues will skyrocket worldwide from a "mere" $50 billion in
1998 to an estimated $3 trillion by 2003.23 Retail sales to consumers were
said to exceed $29.3 billion in 2000, a 75 percent increase over 1999 reve-
nues.24 To be sure, there have been some bumps along the way in this
"Kitty Hawk Age of e-commerce, '2 5 with the market weaning out innu-
merable "dot.com" companies whose ill-conceived business models can-
not survive. But, because the benefits of doing business digitally are
major (the Internet eliminates significant transaction costs, allowing com-
panies to electronically order goods and services, and share data, without
"the middleman" and at huge savings), 26 cyber-markets will continue to
thrive. As businesses realize the value of transacting commerce in a digi-
tal world, they will continue to flock to it-in droves. Indeed, Intel Cor-
poration's chairman has gone so far as to predict that "in five year's time,
all companies will be Internet companies or they won't be companies at
all.",27
This new electronic network has certainly created new opportunities
for business. It has also created new risks. In the frenzy to secure a pres-
ence on the Web, many businesses have failed to properly evaluate the
risks they face, and those risks are not insignificant. Indeed, if you were a
plaintiff's lawyer in search of a moniker for the Internet, you might call it
"virtual heaven." With the click of a few computer keys, a company's
employees can transmit-all too easily and quickly-material that is de-
famatory, offensive, obscene, personally invasive or owned by others.
And, as any lawyer knows, such on-line transmissions can-and often
do-injure reputations, inflict distress, violate personal privacy rights, vi-
(1999). Linking is the practice of providing a connection from one's website directly to
that of another.
23. Maryann Jones Thompson, Tracking the Internet Economy: 100 Numbers You
Need to Know (citing International Data Corp., (http://www.thestandard.com)).
24. "ECommerce Growth Predicted for North America" available at http://cyberatlas.
internet.com/markets/retailing/article/0,1323,6061_408451,00.html#table (last modified
Aug. 8, 2000).
25. Getting Wired: Internet Risks, supra note 16 (quoting Amazon.corn chief executive
officer Jeff Bezos).
26. The Internet has transformed the way business is conducted, allowing businesses
to take advantage of its speed and ease of communication by using "just in time" invento-
ries and eliminating the middleman (and costs) that typically separates many buyers and
sellers. With the Internet's elimination of transaction costs, Cisco Systems reports that it
has shaved $363 million in costs for technical support, distribution and marketing simply by
booking orders via cyberspace. General Electric estimates that it will save $550 million in
the course of three years simply by purchasing goods and services by way of an extranet
site that it has created. Getting Wired: Internet Risks, supra note 16 (citing Log On, Link
Up, Save Big, Bus. WK., June 22, 1998, at 132, 134, 136).
27. Matthew Symonds, The Net Imperative: Within a Few Years, the Internet Will Turn
Business Upside Down. Be Prepared-or Die, ECONOMIST, June 26, 1999, at 5, available at
1999 WL 7363579. As of 1998, it was estimated that 300,000 businesses had opened web
sites on the Internet, and that 95 percent of the Fortune 500 companies had done so. Ex-
posed on the Net, supra note 15, at 108 (citing Iconoclast, Profile of a U.S. User: Business
User of the Internet, (http://www.headcount.com/globalsource/profile 1998)).
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olate trademarks and infringe copyrights. In short, the opportunities to
commit torts electronically are as boundless as cyberspace. 28
The possibility of huge economic losses-caused by the deletion or cor-
ruption of valuable business data-is also vast. In a digital economy in
which information is the new currency, businesses are increasingly depen-
dant upon their ability to access, store and transmit computerized data,
both quickly and easily. Any interference with that ability can, and does,
translate into titanic financial losses. This is no overstatement, as demon-
strated by a series of hacker attacks that shut down the Internet's most
popular websites in February 200029 and a series of viruses whose benign
names (Melissa, Herbie, and Pretty) provide no hint of the harm they left
in their wake. 30 The most notorious of the quickly-spreading viruses was
the so-called Love Bug, which coursed through computer systems
throughout the world in May 2000, erasing data in its path and causing
billions of dollars in losses by the time it was done.31 Sent by e-mail to an
estimated 45 million computers in May 2000,32 the so-called Love Bug
seduced e-mail users with an alluring subject line, "ILOVEYOU" and an
enticement to "kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from
me." When the attached "love letter" was opened, the virus contained
there coursed through computer systems by self-replicating, stealing pass-
words, crashing systems, and deleting files containing valuable data. In
less than one day, the Love Bug had caused more than $15 billion in
losses worldwide, most of it uninsured.33
28. See G. Hernandez, et al., EBUSINESS AND INSURANCE: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TRANS-
ACTING INSURANCE AND OTHER BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, § 8.01, at 21,005 (CCH
2001); see also Old Torts Never Die-They Just Adapt to the Internet, NAT'L L. J. (Sept.
2000).
29. See Nick Wingfield & Scott Thurm, The Internet Under Siege: Stalking the Hackers,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 10, 2000, at B-1, available at 2000 WL 3017448.
30. Greg Chang, "Herbie" Virus is Contained," THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
May 20, 2000, at Cl, available at 2000 WL 4833615; Mark Mueller & Kevin Coughlin, E-
Mail Virus Jolts Agencies Around the Globe, THE STAR-LEDGER, May 5, 2000, at 1, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 20203092 (noting that Melissa caused about $300 million in damage); see
generally Izhar Lev & Michael Knights, Computer Viruses: e-Biological Warfare, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Mar. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10122068.
31. Charles Piller & Greg Miller, Fast-Moving Virus Hits Computers Worldwide: In-
ternet: "Love Bug" Infects Millions of Machines, Destroying Files and Inflicting Costly
Damage, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 5, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 2237858; Mark
Mueller & Kevin Couglin, E-mail Virus Jolts Agencies Around The Globe-Words "I Love
You" Bring Heartache From Trenton to House of Commons, THE STAR-LEDGER, May 5,
2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 20203092; Virus Underscores Risks in E-Commerce, J.
COM. ABSTRACTS 12, May 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4188456; see also David Higgins,
"Love Bug" Cost May Hit Billions, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 6, 2000, at 1, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 18233307 (noting that Love Bug "bigger than Melissa" virus, "making it the
deadliest computer virus so far.").
32. Emma Conners, Love Hurts... And Outlook Dims, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., May
8, 2000, at 31, available at 2000 WL 20840740.
33. Virus Underscores Risks, supra note 32 (putting damage caused by virus at $15.3
billion, but noting most of it is uninsured, quoting Julian James, managing director of
Lloyds in North America); "Love Bug," supra note 32, at 1; see also Reuters Eng. News
Serv., May 8, 2000, available in WESTLAW ALLNEWSPLUS ("Insurers won't be footing
the bill for the estimated $10 billion of damage caused by the 'Love Bug' virus and its
variations, they said on Friday, because most companies don't have special coverage");
20011 2061
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With the promise of more viruses, bugs and hackers to come, 34 and the
prediction by Lloyds of London that "e-commerce will emerge as the sin-
gle biggest insurance risk of the 21' century, ' 35 Internet businesses are
scrambling to evaluate their exposure to such risks and gauge whether
they are adequately protected. The insurance industry has responded to
these new risks with products specifically designed to insure losses and
liability flowing from computer crashes and the loss of data. 36 But In-
ternet companies that have already sustained losses (or that decline to
purchase applicable coverage) will surely try to secure reimbursement
under the "traditional" or standard form policies they already possess.
These would include those policies designed to cover "direct physical loss
or damage" to covered property (first-party property policies) as well as
those designed to insure liability to third parties flowing from such losses
(the third party liability policies, or CGL). While it remains to be seen
how the judiciary will approach this effort, there is no doubt that its re-
sponse will be of momentous economic importance. Because of the na-
ture of the losses caused by computer viruses and hackers, there is also no
doubt that the language of the traditional standard form insurance poli-
cies, and that of the CGL in particular, poses a significant barrier to poli-
cyholders seeking to secure windfalls in the form of a coverage the
policies fail to provide.
II. EVOLUTION OF AN INSURANCE POLICY: HOW AND
WHY THE CGL CAME TO REQUIRE THAT
PROPERTY BE "TANGIBLE"
Standard CGL policies were developed and promulgated by insurance
industry trade organizations in the 1940s, and periodically revised during
the following decades. 37 Most CGL insurance today is written on stan-
dardized forms issued by the Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO"), a
for-profit, rating organization. 38 Although each insurer is free to formu-
Joseph B. Treaster, Companies Won't Say if They Were Insured for Net Attacks, NEW YORK
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at C6 ("The cyberattack is not covered under the standard business
interruption policy" according to an insurance company spokesman).
34. Peter Svensson, Bigger, Nastier "Love Bug" On Loose, New Virus Changes Its
Name, Erases Files, THE COLUMIAN, May 19, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 19277428
(noting that new virus "was not spreading as fast as the 'Love Bug,' but could cause" more
damage "because the new virus erases more files and crashes computers."); Peter Sven-
sson, New Virus, Less Damage, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 20, 2000, at El, available at
2000 WL 5404209 (noting that "'NewLove' computer bug is nastier than its predecessor
but that it caused less damage because network administrators were prepared.").
35. Virus Underscores Risks, supra note 32; Tom McLaughlin, Hackers Attacking In-
ternet Sites with Impunity, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 10, 2000, at 16, available in 2000 WL
4316669.
36. See supra note 14.
37. Wisconsin Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 607 N.W.2d 276, 283
n.3 (Wis. 2000) (citing Laurie Vasichek, Note, Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of
Property Damage" Under the Comprehensive Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REv. 795, 798-
99 n.14 (1984)).
38. Wisconsin Label, 607 N.W.2d at 283 n.3 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509
U.S. 764, 772 (1993)).
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late its own CGL policy, the policy structure developed by ISO is widely
employed. 39 ISO is able to provide its member companies detailed statis-
tical information about risk, claims and pricing as it relates to specific
language drafted by ISO. Most insurers do not have the resources to
offer insurance coverage on terms other than those detailed in ISO-
promulgated CGL forms, meaning ISO's standard forms play a central
role in insurance underwriting.
The CGL has been described by one court as an insurance policy de-
signed "to offer insureds a buffet of standard business liability cover-
ages," 40 allowing each policyholder to select "the types and amounts of
coverage that are suitable to its business." Although insurers can and do
offer special endorsements designed to provide specific protection re-
quired by clients,41 the buffet offered by the CGL is not unlimited, and
typically consists of four specific coverage grants, only one of which is
relevant here: The insurer's promise to defend and indemnify a policy-
holder in lawsuits seeking damages caused by an "occurrence" resulting
in "property damage. '42 An "occurrence" encompasses an accident,43
and while the definition of "property damage" has been refined over the
years, it is typically defined as "physical injury to or destruction of tangi-
ble property, including loss of use resulting therefrom" and "loss of use of
tangible property which has not been physically injured. 44
39. Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hatfield, 228 F.3d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Fresard
v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 327 N.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Mich. 1982)).
40. Reliance, 228 F.3d at 911.
41. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Polymer Tech., Inc., 97 F.Supp.2d 913, 916
(2000) ("While some insurers may alter the forms they receive from ISO and tailor the
standard language based upon the unique coverages requested by their insureds, insurers
often adopt the ISO forms verbatim.").
42. The other standard coverage grants are for "bodily injury," "advertising injury,"
and "personal injury." "Bodily injury" is typically defined as "bodily injury, sickness or
disease sustained by one person." DIMUGNO & GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW
HANDBOOK, § 44.01(4) at 763 (West 2000). "Advertising injury" is typically defined as
injury arising out of certain enumerated offenses (e.g., "oral or written publication of mate-
rial that slanders or libels a person or organization," "oral or written publication of mate-
rial that violates a persons' right of privacy," "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business", "infringement of copyright, title or slogan") and "occurring in the
course of the insured's advertising activities." Id. § 47.01 at 975. "Personal injury" typi-
cally refers to liability arising from a specific set of acts, such as false arrest, detention,
imprisonment; wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private occu-
pancy; publication or utterance of defamatory or disparaging material. Id. § 48.01 at 991-
92.
43. The definition of "occurrence" in the 1986 form is defined as "an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."
DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra note 42, at § 44.01(4).
44. The original "property damage" definition added to policies in 1966 was amended
in 1973 and 1986 to clarify that "tangible property" need not be physically injured to impli-
cate coverage; so long as an "occurrence" results in the loss of use of tangible property, and
that loss of use forms the basis of the plaintiff's grievance and the insured's liability, there
is coverage. The definition in the 1973 form thus stated that "property damage" means (1)
physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period,
including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangi-
ble property which has not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is
caused by an occurrence during the policy period." The 1986 amendments were minor,
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The CGL's core purpose is to protect the policyholder against liability
for damages the insured's negligence may cause to third parties. Among
other specifically identified risks,45 the CGL covers the possibility that
the products or work of the insured will physically damage the property
of another, creating liability for the insured. As a source of those goods
or work, an insured may be responsible as a matter of contract law to
make good on its defective work or products. This may even extend to an
obligation to completely replace or rebuild a deficient product. This lia-
bility, however, is not what CGL coverage is intended to insure.46 Liabil-
ity insurance is not product warranty insurance. Nor does it not cover
purely economic loss, such as loss and liability that results when the in-
sured's work or product is not that for which the plaintiff had bargained.
Likewise, it does not cover lost profits, loss of goodwill, lost productivity
or loss of an investment.47 Rather, it covers the insured for liability it
may face for physical damage or loss to the property of others.48 Thus,
only those losses that constitute a "measure of damages to physical prop-
erty" are recoverable. 49
The CGL's limitation on recovery of economic loss is critical to under-
standing the meaning of "property damage" and how the term came to be
incorporated into the policy. It was precisely because the CGL was never
intended to insure economic losses-a fact that some courts had previ-
ously failed to appreciate-that led ISO's predecessor group to amend
the standard form liability policy in 1965. That year, because of "adverse
court decisions," the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
("NBCU") sought to eliminate any confusion by adding an explicit provi-
sion limiting liability coverage to damages caused by "property dam-
age"-which it then defined as "physical injury to or destruction of
tangible property. '50 Norman Nachman, the manager of the NBCU's
deleting the phrase "destruction of" from the definition. DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra note
43, at §§ 44.01(2)-(4), at 761-63.
45. See supra note 42.
46. This distinction between what is covered, and what is not, is nicely illustrated by
Jacob v. Builders, 592 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Wis. 1999). There, a contractor's defective ma-
sonry work led to the leakage of water into the plaintiff's home. The court held the policy
covered the cost of repairing the water damage to the property of the plaintiff, but did not
cover the cost of repairing the contractor's defective work, which constituted economic loss
based solely upon the contractor's contractual liability.
47. Wisconsin Label, 607 N.W.2d at 283-84 (citations & quotations omitted); Waller v.
Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 626-27 (Cal. 1995); Giddings v. Indus. Indem. Co., 169
Cal. Rptr. 278, 281-82 (Ct. App. 1980).
48. Wisconsin Label, 607 N.W.2d at 283-84; Waller, 900 P.2d at 626-27; Giddings, 169
Cal. Rptr. at 281-82. See also Md. Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723-24 (Ct. App.
1990) (citing Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. 334 P. 2d 881 (Cal.
1959)).
49. Waller, 900 P.2d at 627 (citing Giddings, 169 Cal. Rptr, at 281-82); see also Lucker
Mfg v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 818 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that economic loss "is
recoverable if it provides a measure of damage to the tangible property.").
50. As noted in 1965 by Norman Nachman, the manager of the National Bureau's
Casualty Insurance (other than Automobile) and Multiple Line Insurance Division, "there
were many factors which initiated revisions of the general liability policies," the "most
important" constituting "adverse court decisions" in which courts were "finding it all too
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general liability division, explained nearly 35 years ago that this new lan-
guage would make it clear that the CGL "is not intended to cover intangi-
ble losses such as loss of profits from an unsuccessful business venture. '51
Although the definition has since been amended to clarify that it is in-
tended to also cover "loss of use" of tangible property "not physically
injured," the tangibility requirement remains in the CGL today.
The fact that insurers have declined to cover liability arising out of in-
tangible injuries makes eminent sense. As an actuarial matter, underwrit-
ing risks of liability flowing from damage to intangible interests is difficult
at best. Because risks of damage to intangible interests are impossible to
predict and properly price, the premiums a rational insurer would have to
charge for such coverage would be prohibitively high, as at least one fed-
eral circuit court has recognized:
Insurance companies reasonably might want to exclude coverage for
damage to such intangible interests because estimating the potential
liability for purposes of setting the premium might be very difficult,
or even if the premium could be calculated, insuring against such
liability might expose the company to such increased costs because
of a great variance in liability that a CGL policy might become pro-
hibitively expensive. 52
Therefore, when carving out the risks to be covered (and not covered)
by the CGL, it was sensible for insurers to presume that purchasers of
liability policies-who are principally concerned with the more conven-
tional forms of tort damage that they may cause a third party-would be
willing to bear the risk of loss to traditionally intangible interests in ex-
change for lower premiums. The emergence of new risks that failed to
exist, and that no one contemplated, when the CGL was born more than
50 years ago hardly alters that result.
Nonetheless, in the face of Internet-related liability for the loss or cor-
ruption of computer data, policyholders will no doubt argue that the re-
quirements of the standard CGL are satisfied by their particular claims.
Whether or not the computer data is lost to a hacker, virus, "worm," or
"bug," the question is the same: Whether the loss or corruption of data
constitutes "physical injury to," or "loss of use of," "tangible property."
To answer that question affirmatively, one must be able to conclude that
data is "tangible." As shown below, it simply is not.
easy to adopt hypercritical attitudes towards the 'complex' policy format... " The New
Policy Provisions, supra note 2, at 197-98 & n.1, 2 (quoting Maretti v. Midland Nat'l Ins.
Co., 190 N.E.2d 597 (Il. 1963) and Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 193 A.2d 444 (N.H. 1963)).
The revisions "not only reflect material changes of substance but also changes in form."
Id. One of the more dramatic changes to the policies was the introduction of the "occur-
rence" as the basis for liability coverage, which was designed to "embrace a broader sweep
of casualties" as compared to the policies they replace, but which "is not intended to cover
intangible losses..." Id. at 199-200, 207; see also John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive
Policy: Some of the Changes, INS. COUNSEL J. 223 (April 1966).
51. The New Policy Provisions, supra note 2, at 200.
52. Lucker, 23 F.3d at 819 n.13.
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III. IS DATA TANGIBLE? CAN IT BE PHYSICALLY
DAMAGED? COMMON SENSE AND
ESTABLISHED LAW SAY "NO"
Like any contract, an insurance contract must, if possible, be construed
to give effect to the parties' intent.53 Such intent is to be inferred, if pos-
sible, solely from the written provisions of the contract, considering the
policy as a whole, and giving effect to the words in the policy, as they
would ordinarily be used by a layperson.5 4 This means the court must
take language in its plain, ordinary and popular sense, and not strain to
find ambiguity. 55 In other words, the court "must enforce the contract as
made, and not make another contract for the parties. '56 This objective
theory of contract interpretation is necessarily based upon the following
generally accepted principles: 1) the judiciary's goal is to enforce the par-
ties' contractual intent; 2) words have meaning; and 3) requiring courts to
apply the ordinary meaning of words is, in most cases, the best way to
effectuate the parties' contractual intent.5 7
53. Home Indem. Co. v. Hyplains Beef, L.C., 893 F.Supp. 987, 990 (D. Kan. 1995);
Wisconsin Label, 607 N.W.2d at 282 ("[i]nsurance policies are contracts and are governed
by the same rules that govern interpretation of contracts in general," and "[tihe primary
goal in interpreting a contract is to determine and give effect to the parties' intention.").
54. Bank of the West v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992); Waller v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995); see also Bentz v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co.,
575 A.2d 795, 798 (Md. App. 1990) ("[i]nsurance policies, being contractual, are construed
as other contracts," with words being "given their customary and normal meaning."). The
exception to this general rule is where the parties intended to attach special meanings to
particular words, e.g., through custom and usage, and there is evidence of such intent. See
Fryar v. Currin. 312 S.E.2d 16, 18 (S.C. 1984) (where particular custom or usage attaches
special meaning to words or terms in any particular trade or business, parties can show
peculiar meaning of words to elucidate meaning, however, not to alter, add to, or contra-
dict the contract); see also Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc.,
131 Cal. Rptr. 183, 189 (Ct. App.1976); Della Ratta v. Am. Better Cmty. Devs., Inc., 380
A.2d 627, 635 (Md. App. 1977).
55. McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 N.E.2d 1125, 1127 (I11. 999) (noting that if
terms of policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary
meaning); Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552 (same); Quality Oilfield Prods., Inc. v. Michi-
gan Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App. 1998) (same); see also ACL Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Northbrook Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 214 (Ct. App.1993)
("the flaw" in the insured's proposed construction "is that it strains the word accidental,
wrenching the word from its natural embrace of the concept of unexpectedness."). In addi-
tion, simply because a term is undefined, or there is a dispute as to its meaning, does not
mean an ambiguity exists, or that it is automatically construed against the insurer. If the
insured's proposed construction is inconsistent with its reasonable expectation of coverage,
it is not construed in favor of coverage. See ACL, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215; cf. Hanneman v.
Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 450 (N.D. 1998) ("merely because a contract term is
undefined, disputable, or vague does not mean the issue is automatically resolved in favor
of the insured"); see infra notes 126, 127 and accompanying text.
56. Hyplains, 904 F.Supp. at 990; see also Kimber Petroleum Corp.v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 689 A.2d 747, 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) ("words in an insurance policy
should be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning," and while ambigui-
ties are construed in favor of the insured, courts "'should not write for the insured a better
policy of insurance than the one purchased' "(citations omitted)); Wisconsin Label, 586
N.W.2d at 33 ("We refuse to rewrite the policy by construction to bind Northbrook to a
risk the parties did not contemplate.").
57. Santos v. Dean, 982 P.2d 632, 635 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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The plain and ordinary meaning of "tangible" is enough to dispose of
any argument that corrupted data constitutes damaged "tangible prop-
erty" covered by liability insurance. According to the dictionary, an obvi-
ous starting point in any analysis of the meaning of words, "tangible"
means "capable of being touched: able to be perceived as materially exis-
tent esp. by the sense of touch; palpable, tactile. . . . "58 "Tangible prop-
erty" is defined as "property (as real estate) having physical substance
apparent to the senses." 59 Black's Law Dictionary-a source frequently
cited in insurance coverage decisions60-contains similar definitions, de-
fining "tangible" as "[h]aving or possessing physical form," and
"[c]apable of being touched and seen; perceptible to the touch .... ,,61
Black's defines "tangible property" as "that which may be felt or
touched, and is necessarily corporeal, although it may be either real or
personal, ' 62 and "tangible personal property" as "property such as a
chair or watch which may be touched or felt in contrast to a contract. '63
The common thread throughout these dictionary definitions is the re-
quirement that "tangible" is that which is capable of being touched. That
this meaning is found in every definition of the word "tangible" is hardly
surprising when one considers its etymology. The word "tangible" de-
rives from the Latin word "tangibilis," which is an adjective meaning
"that may be touched," and a Latin (and French) verb, "tangere," which
means "to touch."64
It seems obvious, therefore, that information and ideas-whether they
be manifested in letters or numbers on a piece of paper or in a stream of
bytes and bits in cyberspace-are simply not "tangible" or "tangible
property" as those words are used and commonly understood. Informa-
tion and ideas themselves, however they may be memorialized, are not
"capable of being touched" and have no "physical substance." This
seems particularly true of data in cyberspace, which can be transmitted
and stored in many ways, none of which renders the data capable of being
touched; for example, computer data is transmitted by electronic impulse,
microwaves, or light pulses, and it is typically stored as an imperceptible
58. WEBSTER'S, supra note 4, at 2337; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1242 (2d College ed. 1982) ("tangible" is "a. Discernable by the touch; capable of being
touched; palpable; b. Capable of being treated as fact; real; concrete: tangible evidence.").
59. WEBSTER'S, supra note 4.
60. See Lucker, 23 F.3d at 819 n.13 ("The distinction between tangible and intangible
property made by [the cited insurance coverage] cases tracks the definitions found in
Black's Law Dictionary.").
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1306 (5th ed. 1979).
62. The word "corporeal" "denotes the nature or physical existence of a body" and is
said to be "a term descriptive of such things as have an objective, material existence; per-
ceptible by the sense of sight and touch; possessing a real body." WEBSTER'S, supra note 4,
at 310.
63. BLACK'S, supra note 61, at 1305.
64. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 610 (Clarendon Press 1989); Dr. Ernest
Klein, A COMPREHENSIVE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1570 (Elsevier Publishing Co. 1967).
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"bit" on a computer disk or within its hard drive.65 While the dictionary
definitions of tangibility would seem to easily negate arguments that in-
surance coverage exists for liability flowing from the loss of, or damage
to, data or other intangibles, counsel for policyholders have nonetheless
advanced them. Not surprisingly, they have done so without much
success.
Indeed, while no court has ever squarely held that data alone is "tangi-
ble" for purposes of insurance coverage, at least two courts have stated it
is not.66 A litany of decisions in varied contexts demonstrate a similar,
singular theme: that injury to, or loss of, ideas, information, designs, and
concepts-without actual damage to the medium in which they are con-
veyed-is insufficient to support liability coverage because there is no
damage to, or loss of, tangible property. A few of these decisions deserve
close discussion.
Schaefer/Karpf Prods. v. CNA Ins. Cos.67 addressed the tangibility of a
movie for purposes of liability coverage. In that case, the policyholder
was sued for copying a children's Christmas program onto videocassettes
containing pornographic material. The plaintiff (Schaefer) had produced
a television special called "The Best Christmas Pageant Ever," and there-
after sold the program on videotapes to schools, religious and civic orga-
nizations. Schaefer had contracted with The Video Company ("TVC") to
duplicate the pageant onto 32,500 videotapes, and TVC, then proceeded
to copy the program onto used videotapes which it had obtained from
another company and which, unbeknownst to TVC, contained porno-
graphic movies. As fate would have it, the children's movie was shorter
than the pornography. So, thereafter, in schools across the country, chil-
dren were exposed to sexually graphic material at the end of the "The
Best Christmas Pageant Ever." Schaefer, the owner of the children's
movie, sued TVC, won a $1 million judgment, and thereafter sought pay-
65. Some commentators have gone to great lengths to argue that the electronic pulses
in which computer data is embodied is "tangible" under an insurance contract. Said one:
[Ilt can be argued that computer data is tangible property because data on
programs are coded pulses of electricity which flow through the computer's
circuits... A read-write head, like a phonograph needle, in the computer's
disk drive creates an electromagnetic field... [e]ach iron particle has its own
north and south pole, and the patterns formed by the north and south poles
are a code that represents the information being stored. There is then a
physical character to the information, which is apparent to the computer but
not our senses.
Lorelie S. Masters, Did A Bug Eat Your Data? Insurance Protection in the Information
Age, 1 No. 2 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 7, Nov. 1998 (quoting Garrett L. Joest, III, Insure Your
Computer Software, N.J. LAW. p. 24, Mar. 1, 1993). The commentator's explanation as to
how data exists in cyberspace is itself enough to defeat his own argument that computer-
ized data is "tangible." While electronic impulses may be capable of being "felt" (assum-
ing the right conditions), data itself has no such traits, and can hardly be said to be tangible
as the word is commonly understood. Indeed, the commentator admits computerized data
"is apparent to the computer but not our senses"-te sine qua non of tangibility.
66. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., 490 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computer & More, 147 F.
Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001).
67. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 1998).
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ment from TVC's liability insurer. The question was whether TVC's con-
duct caused the production company to suffer physical injury to, or the
loss of use of, "tangible property" as its insurance contract required.
Schaefer argued to the court that its children's program was injured, and
that such injury provided a basis for coverage. The court disagreed, con-
cluding that the program itself was not "tangible property."
Indeed, the only tangible property involved, said the court, was the
videotapes themselves, but they could not support coverage. This was
because the damage was caused by the existence of the pornographic ma-
terial on the tapes, and the tapes were already defective when Schaefer
purchased them from TVC. In short, TVC had caused no damage to any
tangible property of Schaefer's, a requirement for coverage. 68 The court
reasoned that damage to the children's program itself failed to satisfy the
policy's requirements because "tangible property," "for purposes of a
CGL policy," is property "having physical substance apparent to the
senses," and a "concept is something invisible and incorporeal, having no
substance or body until it is transmitted onto a medium. It is the medium
which is the tangible property, not the concept. '"69
The court then proceeded to acknowledge-and dismiss-the argu-
ment that the Christmas program itself was "tangible" because it was "ap-
parent to the senses:"
Yet, one might argue, when we speak of a painting, Van Gogh's
"Starry Night" for example, we are not speaking about the paint or
the canvas on which the paint sits; we are speaking about Van Gogh's
concept or presentation of a starry night which to us has a physical
substance apparent to our senses separate and apart from the paint
and the canvas. Likewise, when we speak about the program "The
Best Christmas Pageant Ever," we are not speaking about a black
plastic box with a reel of tape inside; we are speaking about Schae-
fer's concept of a story about a Christmas pageant that has taken on
a form, a substance, apparent to our senses. Here, the medium is not
the message.
Whatever might be said of this argument in the world of art or phi-
losophy, we are dealing in this case with the world of insurance-a
practical and prosaic world more Philistine than philosophical, more
artisan than artistic. It is a bedrock principle of this world that the
provisions of insurance contracts are interpreted in their ordinary
and popular sense.70 In this world, videotapes are tangible, concepts
are intangible. 71
Other courts have agreed with Schaefer/Karpf, finding that injury to
movies, design plans and data, without more, fails to constitute damage to
"tangible property" as those words are used in an insurance contract. For
example, in Gulf Ins. Co. v. L.A. Effects Group, Inc.,72 a special effects
68. Id. at 46.
69. Id. at 47.
70. Stamm Theatres, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300, 305 (2001).
71. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
72. 827 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
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production company had been sued for failures that allegedly harmed the
artistic value of the movie Aliens. The court held that the complaint
failed to support coverage, reasoning that there is no argument that "the
film's artistic value has physical substance apparent to the senses. '73 In
Johnson v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.,74 "bank account funds [were] not 'tangi-
ble property' because they have no physical presence" and "merely re-
present, or are evidence of, value." In Peoples Telephone Co., Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,75 the court held that a misappropriated list of mo-
bile telephone numbers was not "tangible" and thus not covered. 76 And,
in Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co.,77 the Third Circuit held that a design for
a particular project-rendered less valuable by the discovery of a defect
in one of its planned components-failed to constitute "tangible prop-
erty" for purposes of insurance coverage. The court reasoned that "we
are bound by the language of the policy," and to "stretch it to include
non-tangible property like the LMS design... would require too great a
departure from the meaning of 'tangible."' 78
The result in each of the above cases might have been different if the
medium on which the movie, the telephone numbers and the design had
been stored or conveyed was actually damaged. Even then, had damage
to the physical medium occurred, the policyholder's (or plaintiff's) recov-
ery would have been limited to the value of the damaged medium itself,
not the diminished value of the represented intangible. The courts have
carefully and appropriately drawn this distinction, finding a basis for cov-
erage where the recovery is "for the value of a tangible medium storing
ideas," and no coverage where the recovery is "for the ideas them-
selves."'79 Where the damage is merely to the value of an idea, it simply
fails to constitute property that can be fairly said to be "tangible."
This distinction can be gleaned from the case law, and indeed, is the
only way to explain Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos.8 0 There, the court
considered "whether computer tapes and data are tangible property
under an insurance policy." Without much analysis, the court concluded
that "at best, the policy's requirement that only tangible property is cov-
ered is ambiguous," and proceeded to find coverage because "[tihe data
on the tape was of permanent value and was integrated completely with
the physical property of the tape."81
73. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
74. 733 A.2d 977, 979 (Me. 1999).
75. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (involving a property policy covering "tangible
property with intrinsic value."). Although Peoples involved first-party coverage, it is signif-
icant because the courts properly attached the plain and ordinary meaning to the word
"tangible" in the context of an insurance contract.
76. 36 F.Supp.2d at 1338.
77. 23 F.3d 808, 820 (3d Cir. 1994).
78. Id. at 821.
79. Id. at 820.
80. 469 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
81. Id. Retail Systems was not the first time a Minnesota court faced the question of
whether lost information constituted "tangible property" under an insurance policy. In
Magnetic Data, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App.
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Not surprisingly, policyholder lawyers and commentators frequently in-
voke Retail Systems as "support" for an argument that computer data is
"tangible" under a CGL.8 2 The argument is misplaced. Only a year after
Retail Systems was issued, the same court returned to the question of
whether data is tangible, and proceeded to clarify that Retail Systems was
a case in which "both the information and the medium on which the infor-
mation was stored were lost."' 83 Unlike Retail Systems, the issue in St.
Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Computer Sys. was the existence of
liability coverage for misappropriated proprietary data. Addressing
whether the information alone constituted "tangible property," the court
held that it did not. It explained that "the information was in a tangible
form: it was put on paper," however, "the information itself was not tan-
gible."'84 The plaintiff's grievance was not that the medium containing
the proprietary information (in this case, paper contained in three-ring
binders) was damaged or lost, but that the information itself (which was
previously subject to the plaintiff's exclusive use) had been taken. There-
fore, because data is not tangible, there was no liability coverage for its
misappropriation. 85
Notwithstanding the reasoning and result in Retail Systems, the intangi-
bility of computer data was apparent to the court in Retail Systems, which
was why (as the Third Circuit aptly notes in Lucker) that court "limited
the coverage to the considerable value of the computer tape as a storage
medium, disallowing recovery for the value of the data it stored. '86 Like-
wise, State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. White87 held that architectural
1988), the Minnesota appellate court expressly bypassed the question of whether the mag-
netically encoded computer data was tangible property. That court's decision in favor of
coverage was thereafter reversed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In explaining its
reasons for reversal, the high court expressly stated that the determination of whether the
computer data was tangible would not be reached because it was not necessary for its
decision. Magnetic Data, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 442 N.W.2d 153, 156
(Minn. 1989).
82. See, e.g., David R. Cohen & Roberta D. Anderson, Insurance Coverage for
"Cyber-Losses", 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 891, 898 & n.27, 30, 31 (Summer 2000); Robert L.
Carter Jr. & Donald 0. Johnson, Keep on Top of Insurance Coverage to Help Combat
Computer Viruses, 15 No. 3 CORP. COONS. 1, Aug. 2000; Leonard D. DuBoff & Scott G.
Garvey, Stay on Guard: Are You Insured For Computer Virus Damage?, 60-SEP OR. ST. B.
BULL. 29, 29, Aug./Sept. 2000; Lorelie S. Masters, Did a Bug Eat Your Data? Insurance
Protection in the Information Age, 1 No. 2 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 7, Nov. 1998.
83. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., 490 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 631.
85. The reasoning of St. Paul v. Network Computer Sys. is entirely consistent with set-
tled law concerning the meaning of tangible. See Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 272, 281 (Ct. App. 1995) ("tangible property" means property "having physical
substance apparent to the senses"); United States Fid. & Guard. Co. v. Barron Indus., Inc.,
809 F.Supp. 355, 360 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (the term tangible in a CGL covers things which are
physical-"capable of being touched and objectively perceivable"); Lucker Mfg., Inc. v.
Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 818 (3d Cir. 1994) ("tangible property is property that can be
felt or touched, or property capable of being possessed or realized"); Hommel v. George,
802 P.2d 1156, 1157 (Colo. App. 1990) ("[t]angible property is that which is capable of
being handled, touched, or physically possessed.").
86. Lucker, 23 F.3d at 820.
87. 777 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
2001] 2071
SMU LAW REVIEW
plans in blueprint form were tangible property covered under a CGL pol-
icy, but limited recovery to the "value of the paper and ink, and not the
value of the ideas the paper and ink embodied." 88 These distinctions
seem to be lost on counsel for policyholders, who frequently and incor-
rectly cite Retail Systems and White for the principle that data alone is
tangible property, and its damage or loss provides a basis for insurance
coverage. As a close analysis of these decisions reveal, they are simply
not authority for that principle.
Another decision frequently cited by attorneys for policyholders is
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Applied Health Care Sys. Inc.,89 a case in which the
Seventh Circuit Court applied California law to find that an insurer owed
a duty to defend the insured against a lawsuit claiming damages caused
by faulty computer equipment sold by the insured. The defective equip-
ment had resulted in the loss of data, the only alleged injury. As shown
below, Centennial is incorrect, primarily because the court failed to prop-
erly understand, and apply, the standards governing an insurer's duty to
defend.
In Centennial, the plaintiff had purchased from the insured, pursuant to
contract, four controllers for its data processing system. Thereafter, the
plaintiff sued, contending "the controllers were defective in that each of
them had a wiring-connection defect that caused them to consistently
malfunction through the random loss of customer billing and patient care
information that had been stored in the system." 90 In the subsequent
coverage action, the court held that the insurer must defend, reasoning
that the complaint alleging computer malfunction and lost data created at
least the possibility of "property damage" and thus triggered a duty to
defend. 91
The Seventh Circuit rejected the tangible-versus-intangible analysis
found in St. Paul v. Computer Network Computer Sys., stating that it was
premature at the duty to defend stage. In particular, the court noted that
the parties "devote considerable attention to whether information stored
in a data processing system may be fairly characterized as tangible prop-
erty."'92 The court explained that "[tlhe resolution of this question,
whatever its intrinsic interest, is not necessary to the decision in this case.
Accordingly, we decline to address it.' '93
The decision is wrong. Whether lost information constitutes tangible
property, and thus "property damage," is not merely of "intrinsic inter-
est"; it is vital to evaluating the insurer's defense obligation at the outset.
If lost data-the only injury claimed by plaintiffs-is not tangible prop-
erty, then the plaintiff in Centennial could not be alleging "property dam-
age," the only basis upon which a defense would be owed. The court in
88. Id. at 954-55.
89. 710 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1983).
90. Id. at 1290.
91. Id. at 1291.




Centennial clearly seemed confused about the standards governing an in-
surer's duty to defend.
The duty to defend, like the duty to indemnify, is predicated upon the
assertion of a claim seeking damages covered by the terms of the policy.94
While insurers have a duty to defend lawsuits creating the potential for
covered damages, this "potentiality" simply refers to the possibility that,
based upon the nature of the plaintiff's allegations against the insured,
the insured could be liable for damages actually (as opposed to possibly)
covered by the policy. 95 In other words, the duty to defend turns upon
the potential for liability on a covered theory, not the potential that allega-
tions may be covered. This itself is a legal question.96 The allegations
(assuming their truth) are either covered or they are not. If they fall
within the scope of coverage, the insurer owes a defense. If they do not,
the insurer owes no defense. It is that simple.
Therefore, where the plaintiff's only basis for damages is lost data, the
policyholder could not be potentially liable on a covered theory-i.e., for
"property damage"-if data is not "tangible property." This is a question
of law97 that had to be resolved by the Seventh Circuit to properly ascer-
tain Centennial Insurance Company's duty to defend. It is the critical
legal question, however, that the court simply declined to answer.
Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of some courts to justify Centennial,9"
the decision cannot be rationalized and is incorrect. Accordingly, reli-
ance upon the decision by policyholders seeking a defense in lawsuits al-
94. Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 277 (Ct. App. 1995); Olympic
Club v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 991 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1993); State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Drasin, 199 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751 (Ct. App. 1984).
95. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276 n.15 (Cal. 1966). The duty to defend,
which is evaluated at the outset of the case and based upon the factual allegations ad-
vanced by the plaintiff, is broader than the duty to indemnify. This is because an insurer
may owe a duty to defend even when it ultimately has no duty to indemnify, which can
result "either because no damages are awarded in the underlying action against the insured
or because the actual judgment is for damages not covered under the policy." Borg v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
96. See Centennial, 710 F.2d at 1291 (noting that duty to defend exists "if any of the
allegations in that action state facts even potentially within the coverage of [the] policy"
(emphasis added)).
97. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 659 (Ct. App. 1998)
(noting that whether complaint alleges covered damages is a legal question).
98. The Third Circuit was clearly concerned in Lucker, with trying to explain the deci-
sions it considered aberrational. It tried to rationalize the result in Centennial on the
ground that "[a] minority of courts have held that where the question of coverage is an
open question the insurer has a duty to defend." Lucker, 23 F.3d at 814 n.5. In fact, that is
not the standard governing an insurer's duty to defend under California law. Where there
is no factual dispute as to the nature of the claims alleged by the plaintiff (as was the case
in Centennial, where the plaintiff alleged a faulty computer system resulted in lost data),
the question of whether the lawsuit seeks covered damages is a question of law. Old Re-
public Ins. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659. The fact that this legal question is unresolved at the
time the plaintiff sues hardly gives rise to a duty to defend. See Peerless Lighting Corp. v.
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that unresolved
legal question relevant to insurer's duty to defend does not give rise to duty to defend).
Rather, when faced with unsettled legal questions relevant to the insurer's duty to defend,
it is the duty of the court to resolve them, not sidestep them.
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leging lost data is simply misplaced. Moreover, there appears to be no
case that squarely holds that faulty computer code, and the resulting loss
of data, gives rise to "property damage" as that term is defined by a CGL.
Given the policy requirement that the property that is damaged (or
whose use is lost) be tangible, this is hardly surprising. 99
If the litany of cases finding that information and ideas are intangible
are not enough to convince policyholders that no liability coverage exists
for causing the loss of data, a decision recently issued in the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma should suffice. Employing a correct analysis of the
duty to defend, the federal district court in State Auto Property and Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Midwestern Computers & More'00 addressed whether an
insurer owed a duty to defend a policyholder in a lawsuit alleging that its
negligent performance of service work on a computer system caused data
loss. Looking to dictionary definitions for the ordinary meaning of the
word "tangible," the court held that the alleged loss of electronic data
could not support a defense under the liability policy because data, by
itself, is not perceptible to the human senses:
Although the medium that holds the information can be perceived,
identified or valued, the information itself cannot be. Alone, com-
puter data cannot be touched, held or sensed by the human mind; it
has no physical substance. It is not tangible property.10
The Midwestern Computers case could hardly be described as revolu-
tionary. To the contrary, it simply embraces the obvious, holding that the
ordinary meaning of the word "tangible" cannot be stretched to include
that which cannot be humanly perceived. It is, however, significant be-
cause it is among the first decisions to squarely hold that computer data
itself is not tangible property, such that its loss (or corruption) will not
99. Policyholders have also argued that the incorporation of defective software into a
computer system, thereby resulting in lost or tainted data, constitutes "property damage"
under a CGL policy, on the theory that the tangible computer network is physically dam-
aged. A district court in the Northern District of California rejected that argument in
Seagate Technology v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 11 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1154-55 (N.D.
Cal. 1998), holding that the installation of a defective disk drive did not physically injure
the host computer, and instead, only resulted in an intangible injury, namely, the loss or
corruption of data. See also New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Vieira, 930 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that installation of defective drywall in homes did not constitute "physical
damage to tangible property"); Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Co., 103 F.3d 750 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that faulty workmanship in construction of building failed to raise the
possibility of coverage for "physical injury" to the property). The answer is different if the
defective product or part that is incorporated actually causes physical injury to the prop-
erty into which it is incorporated. Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg.,
Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 376-77 (Ct. App. 2000); see, e.g., Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1992) (defective plumbing that caused water leakage to
houses and apartments into which it was installed constituted "property damage"). The
courts have applied this rule to hold that parts that are inherently dangerous and that must
be removed, such as asbestos, constitute property damage. See Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the
presence of asbestos constituted injury to building "because the potentially hazardous ma-
terial is physically touching and linked with the building" and had to be removed, thereby
causing loss to the products in which it is incorporated).
100. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (W.D. Okla. 2001)
101. Id., at 1116.
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support property damage coverage under a liability policy.10 2
In sum, tangibility is the touchstone of "property damage" coverage
under a CGL. Because words are to be given their ordinary meaning,
and because information and ideas cannot be "touched or felt,"'10 3 infor-
mation and ideas-however, memorialized-are not "tangible property"
and no coverage will flow from their loss or corruption. The answer may
be different if the physical medium on which information or ideas is
stored or conveyed-e.g., the computer tape or disk itself-is actually lost
or damaged, and the damaged medium forms part of the plaintiffs griev-
ance against the insured. Any recovery, however, is necessarily limited to
the value of the damaged media. The contract simply provides for noth-
ing more.
IV. AMERICAN GUARANTEE & LIABILITY INS. CO. V.
INGRAM MICRO, INC.: AN OMINOUS ANOMALY
In the face of dictionary definitions and case law confirming that "tan-
gible" property is that which has "physical substance" and that can be
"touched, seen and smelled,' 10 4 one might easily conclude that argu-
ments of coverage under standard form insurance contracts for lost or
tainted data are doomed to fail. It would be a conclusion supported by
common sense, but not recent history. In a decision that made news in
the insurance industry last year, a federal district court held that lost com-
puter data constituted "physical loss or damage" under a first-party prop-
erty policy. The court's reasoning violated fundamental principles
governing contract interpretation (namely that the ordinary meanings of
words in a contract control), and as one would expect, was incorrectly
decided. Although the case involved the meaning of "physical" under a
first-party property policy (and not "tangible" under a CGL), it is rele-
vant to coverage under a CGL because the meaning of "physical" and
"tangible" are closely intertwined. Accordingly, if a court can conclude
that the loss of data is a "physical" loss, it can just as easily conclude that
data itself is "tangible" under a liability policy. 10 5 The case provides a
102. The court did go on to note that the claimant's inability to use its computer as a
result of the insured's negligence would support a defense, on the theory that the ability to
use the computer, which itself was tangible, had been lost. This allegation fell within the
coverage for "loss of use of tangible property." In the end, however, the court found no
defense was owed due to the applicability of an exclusion that eliminated any possibility of
coverage. 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-18.
103. See supra notes 4, 5, 61, 62, 64 & 66 and accompanying text.
104. See Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 P.3d 223, 229 ( Cal. 2001) (holding that
"'tangible property' is not ambiguous," and "[c]onsistent with an insured's reasonable ex-
pectations, 'tangible property' refers to things that can be touched, seen, and smelled"
(citing Warner v. Fire Ins. Exch., 281 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct. App. 1991)).
105. Although wrong, one can be sure policyholder lawyers arguing in favor of expan-
sive coverage, without regard for the policy's terms, will seek to use Ingram Micro in an
effort to create coverage for liability flowing from the loss of data caused by electronic
glitches. See, e.g., David R. Cohen & Roberta D. Anderson, Insurance Coverage for
"Cyber-Losses", 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 891 (2000) (arguing for the existence of insurance
coverage for "cyber-risks" under standard liability policies, and noting significance of In-
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disturbing example of how far a court will go to create coverage for an
intangible loss, and thus deserves discussion.
In American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc.,' 06 a power
outage had rendered the insured's computer systems inoperable for a pe-
riod of time, resulting in the erasure of programming data within the
computer's random access memory.10 7 The data had to be re-entered,
and the insured sought coverage for losses flowing from this event under
a first-party policy that protected the insured's "[r]eal and personal prop-
erty, business income and operations in the world wherever situated"
against "[a]ll risks of direct physical loss or damage from any cause."'108
The issue was whether the computer system's loss of data constituted a
"physical loss or damage." The court held that it did.10 9
Although Ingram's policy was a first-party property policy and did not
cover an insured's liability to third parties for "property damage," the
court concluded that Ingram "does allege property damage-that as a re-
sult of the power outage, Ingram's computer system and world-wide net-
work physically lost the programming information and custom
configurations necessary for them to function." 110 It so found even
though the computer network had no difficulty accepting the data when it
was re-entered, operated precisely as it had before it lost the data, and
thus was not itself actually damaged."' The court reasoned, however,
that Ingram's mainframes were "physically damaged" during the one and
one half hours that it took Ingram employees to manually reload the lost
programming information. In addition, the court reasoned, the insured's
computer network called "Impulse" was also "physically damaged" by its
loss of data, because employees were required to electronically bypass
the system for eight hours. Calling the electronic loss of data a physical
gram Micro decision); Dawn Dinkins, Internet Liabilities: A Look at Coverage Under the
Traditional Commercial General Liability Policy, 16 No. 6 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB.
REP. (Andrews 2001) (noting, without analysis, that CGL's definition of "property dam-
age" "may also provide coverage for computer related property loss," and stating that the
Ingram Micro case supports the position that the loss of data, without more, supports a
claim that "physical damage" has occurred); compare Walter J. Andrews & Edward J.
Grass, Curing the Fever for Virus Coverage Under Traditional Property Policies, MEALEY'S
CYBER TECH REP. 2, No. 6, 20-24 (2000) (explaining why Ingram Micro was incorrectly
decided).
106. 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. April 18, 2000).
107. Id. at *1-2.
108. Id. at *1.
109. An earlier court had faced, but declined to reach, the question of insurance cover-
age for lost electronic data under a first-party policy insuring "direct physical loss." In
Home Indem. Co. v. Hyplains Beef, 893 F.Supp. 987 (D. Kan. 1995), the insured had
sought insurance coverage under a first-party policy for the loss of data caused by the
failure of its computer systems. The court never reached the question of whether lost data
constituted a "physical loss" under the business interruption policy because it found no
coverage on the ground that the operations were not suspended as the policy required.
110. Ingram Micro, 2000 WL 726798, at *3 (emphasis in original).
111. On that basis, the insurer argued that the computer system was not "physically
damaged" because its capability to perform its intended functions remained intact. The
insured countered that the fact that the mainframe computers and matrix switch retained
the ability to accept the restored information and operate as before did not mean that they
did not undergo physical damage. Id. at *2.
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loss, however, does not make it one. 112
Critical to determining whether coverage existed under Ingram Micro's
policy is the meaning of the word "physical," which modified the words
"loss" or "damage" "from any cause." In short, the word described the
nature of the risks the policy covered. When used as an adverb, "physi-
cally" means "in respect to the body"113 and, when used as an adjective,
"physical" means "of or relating to natural or material things as opposed
to things mental, moral, spiritual or imaginary." 114 According to Black's
Law Dictionary, "physical" means "relating or pertaining to the body, as
distinguished from the mind or soul or the emotions." ' 1 5 The legal dic-
tionary explains that "physical injury" means "bodily harm or hurt, ex-
cluding mental distress, fright, or emotional disturbance," and that
"physical harm" is "used throughout the Restatement of Torts to denote
the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels. 116
As the above definitions illustrate, along with those that explain the
meaning of both "tangible" and "tangible property," the word "physical"
is closely linked with tangibility, which requires a "physical substance ap-
parent to the senses" and which is "capable of being touched. 11 7 In
other words, to be capable of physical injury, the thing that is injured
must be material, or tangible. By definition, viruses, computer bugs or an
electronic glitch that corrupts or erases data-i.e., intangibles-cannot
cause physical loss to that data. Likewise, that which supposedly caused
"physical loss or damage" to the computers in Ingram Micro-the loss of
data-was not a tangible, or material, thing. The fact that the erased data
was restored from purely intangible sources-with the manual re-entry of
data itself, or by downloading such from the memory of another com-
puter-further underscores the absence of any "physical" loss or damage
to a tangible thing.118
112. The court's result-driven approach is reminiscent of a riddle with which Abraham
Lincoln is credited: "How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg? Five? No,
calling a tail a leg don't make it a leg." Bank One Dayton, NA v. Limbach, 533 N.E.2d 624,
627 n.5 (Ohio 1990) (citing Morley, The Shorter Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (1953), at
218(d)).
113. WEBSTER'S, supra note 4, at 1707.
114. Id. at 1706.
115. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1032.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 4, 5, 61-67 and accompanying text; see also United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Barron Indus. Inc., 809 F. Supp.355, 360 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (term tangible in a
CGL covers things which are "physical"); Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 P.3d 223,
229 (Cal. 2001) (noting that an easement is "an incorporeal or intangible property right
that does not relate to physical objects"); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881, 885 (Cal. 1959) (treating the terms "physical" and tangible"
synonymously, by stating in its interpretation of a policy that covers "injury to or destruc-
tion of property," "it is clear that the word property refers to physical or tangible
property.")
118. See Walter J. Andrews & Edward J. Grass, Curing the Fever for Virus Coverage
Under Traditional Property Policies, MEALEY'S CYBER TECH REP. 2, No. 6, 20, (Aug. 2000)
(hereinafter "Curing the Fever").
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Instead of giving effect to the word "physical" as it is ordinarily used,
the Ingram Micro court simply read it out of the contract, asserting that
the claim at issue involved "physical damage" without any analysis of the
words themselves. Indeed, the district court never even addressed the
significance, let alone the meaning, of the word "physical" in the context
of the policy. It simply stated that it had to "side with" the insured's
broader definition of "physical damage" given that the claim arose "[alt a
time when computer technology dominates our professional as well as
personal lives."' 119 In a veritable intellectual frolic and detour, it then
proceeded to cite a variety of federal and state criminal laws addressing
the meaning of "computer damage" (as opposed to "physical loss or dam-
age") in the context of statutes enacted to codify the loss of computer
data as an injury that may result in criminal and civil liability.120 The
court worked hard to justify this creative approach to construing
contracts:
The Court is mindful that these definitions appear not in insurance
coverage cases, but in the penal codes of various states. Their rele-
vance, however, is significant. Lawmakers around the country have
determined that when a computer's data is unavailable, there is dam-
age; when a computer's services are interrupted, there is damage;
and when a computer's software or network is altered, there is dam-
age. Restricting the Policy's language to that proposed by American
would be archaic.121
Of course, the issue was not whether there was "damage" but whether
that "damage," was "physical." Whatever politicians may have decided
about what conduct should subject persons to criminal or civil liability has
nothing to do with whether a particular loss falls within a contract's
terms. While a legislative decision to pass statutes creating new civil lia-
bilities may motivate insurers to sell products insuring those liability risks,
it fails to answer whether the terms of a contract, as written, actually in-
sure that risk. 122 This was the question with which Ingram Micro was
faced, but it was a question to which the court had little interest in an-
swering, at least pursuant to the settled rules governing the manner in
which contracts (including insurance contracts) are to be construed.123
119. Ingram Micro, 2000 WL726798, at *2.
120. See Curing the Fever, supra note 118, at 21 (arguing that the statutes cited by the
court actually supported a finding that the loss of data was intangible, on the theory that
existing laws were insufficient to deal with the theft of intangible property, requiring the
passage of statutes designed to deal with the intangible nature of injuries caused by com-
puter theft).
121. Ingram Micro, 2000 WL726798, at *3.
122. Nonetheless, this is an approach that is frequently advocated by those seeking to
establish coverage in spite of, as opposed to based upon, the plain meaning of a policy's
terms. See, e.g., Insurance Coverage for "Cyber-Losses, " supra note 105, at 900 (seeking to
draw significance to meaning of "tangible" from federal wire fraud statute criminalizing
the theft of a "good, wares or merchandise," and the federal copyright statute.)
123. See Curing the Fever, supra note 118, at 21 (noting that the Ingram Micro court
reached its decision "based on a stated perception of what traditional property policies
should cover rather than what their terms actually provide."). The insurer in Ingram Micro
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Equally misguided are efforts by courts and commentators to glean sig-
nificance from tax cases in their effort to evaluate the tangibility of
data.'2 4 Property must be "tangible" to be taxable under various state
statutes, requiring courts construing those statutes to evaluate the mean-
ing of the word "tangible." However, the tax cases, as they are called, are
of little or no significance. First, they are inconsistent.12 5 More funda-
mentally, the standards governing statutory construction fail to coincide
with those governing the interpretation of contracts. In construing tax
statutes, courts are guided by their perceptions of the policy embodied in
the statute and considerations of equity among taxpayers. They also look
to legislative history, which may show the legislature intended "X" to
mean "Y." But regardless of the correctness of these decisions as a mat-
ter of tax law, reasons of that sort have nothing to do with construing
insurance policies.
In ascertaining the meaning of words of an insurance contract, the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words, as used in the context of the
policy, must control. And, while the Ingram Micro court may consider
this approach to construing contracts "archaic,"'126 it is more accurately
described as "fair." Courts are not entitled to question the wisdom of
policy provisions, but must apply contracts as written. Where a contrac-
tual term has a literal meaning, the judiciary is not free to construe it
differently:
[W]e do not rewrite any provision of any contract, including the stan-
dard policy underlying any individual policy, for any purpose. To do
so ... might have untoward effects generally on individual insurers
and individual insureds and also on society itself. Through the stan-
dard policy, individual insurers made promises, and individual in-
sureds paid premiums, against the risk of loss. To rewrite the
provision.., might compel insurers to give insureds more than they
promised and might allow insureds to get more than they paid for,
thereby denying their "general[] freedom to contract as they
filed an interlocutory appeal, which was rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Ingram Micro re-
mains unpublished.
124. See Spencer M. Taylor & Sean W. Shirley, Insurance and Cyber-Losses: Coverage
for Downloading Disaster, 62 ALA. LAW., 192, 196 (2001); Gary J. Valeriano, Pitfalls in
Insurance Coverage for "Computer Crimes," 59 DEF. CouNs. J. 511, 517 (1992); see, e.g.,
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Int'l Protective Agency, Inc., 19 P.3d 1058 (Wash. App. 2001) (in
evaluating whether a license is intangible under insurance contract, noting that it is intangi-
ble for tax purposes); Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 469 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn. App.
1991) (in evaluating coverage for lost data and damaged computer tape, noting that "the
majority of tax decisions find that computer tapes are intangible property for tax
purposes").
125. Compare Texas Instruments v. U.S., 551 F.2d 599, 611 (5th Cir. 1977) (information
stored on computer tapes "tangible property" for tax purposes); S. Cent. Bell Tel. v.
Barthelemy, 643 So.2d 1240, 1241 (La. 1994) (holding computer software to constitute tax-
able tangible personal property) with Ronnen v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 74, 100 (1988) (informa-
tion stored on duplicate computer disks not tangible property); Dist. of Columbia v.
Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (computer tapes are
intangible property); Fingerhut Prods. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, 610
(Minn. 1977) (characterizing marketing information as intangible property).




Applying the literal meaning of words, without consideration of the
results, furthers the goals of insureds and insurers alike by recognizing
"bright line rules" capable of simple application: "It has a tendency to
promote fairness and efficiency in the judicial sphere. By increasing cer-
tainty and decreasing uncertainty about the duty to indemnify, it serves to
deter some litigation on the issues and to conclude what it does not deter
expeditiously and soundly."'1 28
Policyholders are sure to argue that the absence of a policy definition
for a particular word-whether it be the word "tangible" or "physical"-
renders the word ambiguous, requiring the courts to construe the con-
tracts in favor of coverage. 129 This argument should fail. Critical terms
are frequently undefined in the policy. 130 "Likewise, disagreement con-
cerning the meaning of a phrase, or the fact that a word or phrase isolated
from its context is susceptible of more than one meaning," hardly renders
it ambiguous.' 3 ' This has been reaffirmed in too many cases to count.132
A rule requiring every policy term to be defined would be impossible,
127. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, v. Super. Ct., 16 P.3d 94, 108 (Cal.
2001); see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209,212 (Mass. 1984) ("We
read the policy as written. We are not free to revise it or change the order of the words.").
128. Lloyds of London, 16 P.3d at 107 (citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Lorelie S. Masters, Did A Bug Eat Your Data? Insurance Protection in
the Information Age, 1 No. 2 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 7, Nov. 1998 ("In an insurance context,
courts have found undefined terms to be ambiguous, and define it in favor of coverage.").
130. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Sup. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992) (rejecting
bank's claim that undefined term 'unfair competition' was ambiguous, for terms "cannot
be found to be ambiguous in the abstract"'); Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 959 P.2d 265, 272 (Cal. 1998) ("fact that a term is not defined in the policies does not
make it ambiguous"); Ctr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 618 N.W.2d 505, 510 (N.D. 2000)("absence of definition in and of itself does not establish ambiguity") (quoting Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1317, 1323 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1988)).
131. Foster-Gardner, 959 P.2d at 272 (quoting Castro v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins.
Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("neither the mere absence of a policy definition
nor the presence of a dispute as to meaning of the provision necessarily renders the policy
or term ambiguous"); Smith v. Neumann, 682 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (II. App. 1997) ("the
absence of a definition does not render a policy term ambiguous, nor is it ambiguous sim-
ply because the parties can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning").
132. See supra note 130; Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 746 A.2d 607, 612 (Pa. Super.
1999) (differing interpretations of insurance policy provision does not render it ambiguous,
and superior court would be "abdicating" its role if it decided case "by the purely mechani-
cal process of searching the nation's courts" for conflicting decisions); Powell v. Alemaz,
Inc., 760 A. 2d 1141, 1147 (N.J. App. 2000) ("An insurance policy is not ambiguous merely
because two conflicting interpretations of it are suggested by the litigants. Rather, both
interpretations must reflect a reasonable reading of the contractual language"); Wickland
v. Am. Travelers Life Ins. Co., 513 S.E.2d 657, 664 n.l (W.Va. 1998) ("Although we have
recognized that the parties to this appeal have advanced conflicting interpretations of the
long-term care policy language at issue herein, such disagreement does not automatically
render the policy language ambiguous so as to preclude our resort to the plain, ordinary
meaning of the constituent terms"); Lemars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 307(Iowa 1998) ("a mere disagreement between the parties regarding the meaning of unde-
fined terms does not automatically establish an ambiguity"); see also Sullins v. Allstate Ins.




because the defining terms would have to be defined, leading to an
unintelligible morass.
Indeed, any rule that rigidly presumed ambiguity from the absence
of a definition would be illogical and unworkable. To avoid the am-
biguity perceived by the Court of Appeal, an insurer would have to
define every word in its policy, the defined words would themselves
then have to be defined, their defining words would have to be de-
fined, and the process would continue to replicate itself until the re-
sult became so cumbersome as to create impenetrable ambiguity. 133
V. "LOSS OF USE" OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY: WHERE THE
COVERAGE BATTLES MAY BE FOUGHT
Because the loss or corruption of "data" cannot be fairly characterized
as "physical injury to tangible property," the best argument for CGL cov-
erage is found in the second prong of the CGL's "property damage" defi-
nition. That provision defines "property damage" as "loss of use of
tangible property which is not physically injured." The argument is not
that the loss of data itself constitutes the "loss of use of tangible prop-
erty" (obviously because data is not tangible), but that the computer's use
is lost if one is unable to retrieve data from it. In other words, the com-
puter network itself-the only tangible property-is useless, and cover-
age is thus implicated. 34
The argument has some appeal, but the appeal is largely superficial
when one considers the hurdles (and case law) standing in its way. First
of all, the argument can only succeed if the inability to use the computer
hardware itself, and not simply the inability to retrieve or access data,
constitutes the basis for the plaintiff's claimed injury. 135 In addition, the
computer network-the tangible property purportedly lost-must itself
be rendered inoperable by an unexpected event, and its actual functions
133. Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1270
(Cal. 1993) (citations omitted).
134. See, e.g., Internet Liabilities, supra note 105; Michael P. Murphy & Aidam P. Mc-
Cormick, Challenging Insurance Coverage for Year 2000 Computer Failure Claims, 34
TORT. & INS. L.J. 883, 896 (1999); Scott P. Devries et al., Insurance Coverage for Y2k
Expense Under First Party "All Risk" Policies, 5 No. 7 DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 15 (An-
drews 1999); Robert L. Carter, Jr. & Donald 0. Johnson, Keep on Top of Insurance Cover-
age To Help Combat Computer Viruses, 15 No. 3 CORP. COUNS. 1 (Aug. 2000). At least
one court has accepted this theory of coverage, where the insured's negligent work on a
computer rendered it inoperable. In Midwestern Computers, supra, the district court found
the CGL's "property damage" requirement was satisfied where the claimants "plainly al-
lege[d] in their state court petition that defendant's negligence caused a loss of use of their
computers." 147 F.Supp. 2d at 1116. The court further noted that pre-litigation correspon-
dence supported the allegation that the plaintiffs "'were left without the use of their com-
puters"' as a result of the insured's negligence. Id.
135. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Maine Teachers Assoc., 449 A.2d 358, 361 (Me.
1982) (where facts that may have supported coverage were not part of plaintiff's complaint
against the insured, such facts could not "constitute a basis for a determination that cover-
age exists"); Michigan Ed. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Karr, 576 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Mich.
App. 1998) (whether duty to defend exists depends upon the allegations of the complaint,
and "it is necessary to focus on the basis for the injury and not the nomenclature of the
underlying claim in order to determine whether coverage exists").
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truly adversely affected by the loss of data (which was not the case in
Ingram Micro). This is because, although some courts have held that tan-
gible property rendered "useless" can qualify as a "loss of use" for pur-
poses of coverage, this "uselessness" refers to property that is rendered
completely inoperable. 136 The courts have squarely rejected arguments
that the standard CGL policy only requires "some loss of use" as opposed
to "complete uselessness."' 137 Thus, unless a computer virus crashes the
computer hardware, rendering it completely inoperable, there are not
sufficient facts to support a "loss of use" claim.' 38
Even assuming the above requirements can be met, this argument for
coverage will probably fail in many contexts involving lost or corrupted
data, primarily because the nature of any resulting injuries are likely to be
purely economic, including, for example, lost productivity (represented
by employees' inability to retrieve data), lost profits (represented by the
employees' inability to use data), increased operating costs (represented
by the cost of manually retrieving data or re-inputting data into the com-
puter) and lost goodwill (represented by the loss of business from disap-
pointed or concerned customers). 139 Such purely economic losses are not
insurable, even if cast as "property damage.' 140 The "loss of use" provi-
sion is particularly susceptible to being invoked as a basis for coverage
where the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury is economic. For this
reason, courts are resistant to efforts by policyholders (or plaintiffs) to
characterize an economic loss as a "loss of use," critically examining the
136. Wisconsin Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 586 N.W.2d 29, 35(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (identifying source of "uselessness" standard, and holding that where
the "products themselves were still entirely useable," the policyholder "fails to meet the
uselessness requirement"); see also Trio's Inc v. Jones Sign Co., 444 N.W.2d 443, 444-45(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (no "loss of use" where malfunctioning sign did not render part of the
building "useless" and distinguishing case in which products "were rendered unusable.").
137. Wisconsin Label, 586 N.W.2d at 35.
138. The inability to operate the computer networking systems is apparently key to
securing coverage on this basis, as the analysis in several cases makes clear. See, e.g., Mc-
Dowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 711 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1983)(finding no "loss of use" for purposes of "property damage" coverage on ground that fur-
naces at issue were still operable); Sola Basic Indus. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 280
N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1979) (finding loss of use to be basis for coverage where insured's re-
moval of transformer had rendered plaintiff's "furnaces inoperable until the transformer
was replaced"); USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Corp., 99 F.Supp.2d 593 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (no
basis for "loss of use" coverage where the "steel companies were at all times able to use
their production equipment and merely sought lost savings from the reduced prices which
competition would have produced"); see also Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 818 F.Supp.
821, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("McDowell-Wellman plainly illustrates what is meant by 'loss of
use' in a CGL policy. Both the district court and the Third Circuit found that there was no
'loss of use' because the blast furnaces were capable of operating and producing steel as
intended, despite the collapse of the ore bridge."), affd on other grounds, 23 F.3d 808 (3d
Cir. 1994).
139. See, e.g., Keep on Top of Insurance Coverage, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that Love
Bug's $10 billion in damages included "lost business, the cost of eliminating the virus from
computer systems and the cost of repairing, to the extent possible, damaged computer
files").
140. See supra note 48.
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nature (and source) of the underlying injury. 141
This is why there was no coverage for the inability to sell herring due to
the insured's alleged price-fixing (resulting in lost profits), 142 the inability
to sell real estate due to the interference with an easement by a neigh-
bor,143 a contractor's failure to adequately maintain public streets, requir-
ing their closure and resulting in the loss of access (and thus profits) to
businesses, 144 and the inability to sell condominiums lost to foreclosure
by the insured's negligence (resulting in investment losses). 145 All were
held to be outside the scope of "property damage" coverage, notwith-
standing the insureds' claims of lost use of real estate, businesses, and
fish-all tangible property. Thus, while some courts have stated that the
"loss of use" provision can implicate "property damage" coverage where
the tangible property was "made useless,"' 46 those same courts have re-
jected efforts by policyholders to re-cast their economic claims as "prop-
141. See, e.g., Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 P.3d 223 (Cal. 2001) (although
landowner claimed that insured obstructed an implied common easement with the con-
struction of improvements onto property, court found no "loss of use" of tangible property
to support liability coverage because "[i]t is the nature of the easement right that was at
issue, not the physicalities that may relate to it"); Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 272 (Ct. App.1995) (interference with, or the right to use an easement, concern
interference with economic interest in property, and fail to support claim for "loss of use"
of "tangible property").
142. L. Ray Packing Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 832, 834-35 (Me.
1983) (holding that fishermen's "inability to sell the herring in a free market [due to the
insured's alleged price-fixing] is [not] a loss of use of the herring" for purposes of "prop-
erty damage" coverage because the nature of the underlying action seeks lost profits).
143. Kazi, 15 P.3d at 223.
144. Gibson & Assocs., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 966 F. Supp. 468, 473-74 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(responsibility for profits lost to denial of physical access by shop owners' to their busi-
nesses "represents neither physical injury to tangible property nor loss of use of tangible
property that is not physically injured; rather, it constitutes purely economic loss."); but see
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Mass. 1984) (finding damages
flowing from physical obstruction to stores, resulting in lost profits, to be covered as "loss
of use" within CGL's property damage provision).
145. Hommel v. George, 802 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (insured's failure
to complete construction of condominium units, resulting in their foreclosure, did not sup-
port "loss of use" claim by investors, who in actuality, were complaining about a loss on
their investment, which is an economic, and thus uninsured, injury); see also Liberty Bank
of Montana v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 870 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that economic losses which resulted from loss of right to claim security
interest in certain property constituted a loss of use of tangible property).
146. See L. Ray Packing, 469 A.2d at 835 (citing Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Polar
Panel Co., 457 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1972) (loss of use of farm land due to defective seed
constitutes "loss of use" of tangible property)); Pittway Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co.,
370 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (I11. App. 1977) (recognizing, but not applying, rule allowing insur-
ance coverage where tangible property has been diminished in value or made useless with-
out actual physical injury to the tangible property, but denying coverage for losses caused
by defective valve assemblies in aerosol cans on basis of policy exclusion and failure to give
timely notice); Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1954)
(finding that application of plaster that shrunk and cracked after being applied supported
"loss of use" claim for purposes of liability coverage); see also Hendrickson v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co. of Ill., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 626-27 (Ct. App.1999) ("loss of use of tangible prop-
erty" found to exist to support liability coverage where insured provided defective straw-
berry plants to growers, and growers lost use of their land, and lost profits from lost
strawberry production constituted measure of damages as a result of "property damage").
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erty damage" claims in an effort to secure CGL coverage. 147
Finally, without regard to the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury,
some courts will reject a "loss of use" theory of recovery if there is no
causal link between physical damage to tangible property and the result-
ing loss of use. This is particularly true if the insured is seeking to secure
liability coverage under an older ISO policy (issued before 1973),"48 or a
customized policy, in which the "physical injury" and "loss of use" prongs
of the modern definition are not separately set forth-providing instead,
for example, that "property damage" means "physical injury to tangible
property including loss of use resulting therefrom." In this context, courts
have held that no coverage exists unless the "loss of use" is "causally
related to damage to tangible property."1t 49 The rationale is that, not-
withstanding any subsequent efforts by ISO to amend and clarify the
scope of coverage for "property damage" in its standard CGL, those clar-
ifications did not change the basic expectation of the parties-in place
when the contracts were entered-that the lost use must be caused by
some physical damage to tangible property.150 Because the intent of the
parties at the time the contract was formed controls, that intent, and the
parties' expectations based upon the words used, "provides the relevant
focus" in the context of "loss of use" claims. 15' Thus, putting aside the
difficulty of trying to characterize injuries flowing from lost or corrupted
data as non-economic, those policies with older (or customized) language
may provide additional hurdles to coverage, particularly where the "loss
of use" provision is not made distinct from the requirement that physical
injury occur to tangible property.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that the terms of an insurance policy fail to support coverage
for cyber-liability simply means the insurer has not provided it and the
147. See L. Ray Packing, 469 A.2d at 835, holding that "loss of use" provision "does not
include mere economic damage in the nature of loss of investments, anticipated profits,
and financial interests" and (citing Lowenstein Dyes & Cosmetics, Inc. v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 524 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1959); Johnston v. Tally Ho, Inc., 303 A. 2d 677 (Del. Super.
1973); Ludwig Candy Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 1329 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979).
148. See supra note 44 concerning ISO's standard form "property damage" definition in
1966, 1973 & 1986.
149. USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 99 F.Supp.2d 593, 615-16 & n.16 (W.D. Pa. 2000);
McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 711 F.2d 521, 526 (3d
Cir. 1983); Yakima Cement Prod. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 608 P. 2d 254, 258-59 (Wash.
1980); Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. High Concrete Structures, Inc., 858 F.2d 128, 136 (3d
Cir. 1988); compare Borg v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 816 & n.2 (Ct.
App.1996) (holding that policy covering "physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of
tangible property" insured "loss of use" without any requirement of physical damage to
tangible property) with Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 279-80 (Ct.
App.1995) (holding that policy insuring "physical injury to or destruction of tangible prop-
erty, including loss of its use" provided no coverage for lost use of property in the absence
of physical injury to it).
150. USX Corp, 99 F. Supp.2d at 615 n.16.
151. Id. at 615.
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policyholder has not paid for it. That the standard liability insurance pol-
icy fails to protect against this new risk is hardly astounding. Purchasers
of CGL coverage vary greatly in terms of their exposure to risk, and
CGLs are typically designed to insure the type of risks against which most
policyholders need protection. Even today, many policyholders face little
or no risk of liability due to the loss or corruption of computer data, and
such policyholders obviously have no desire to pay additional premiums
to subsidize those who do. Accordingly, businesses seeking coverage for
this risk should seek special endorsements or any of the policies now
available specifically providing such. For its part, the judiciary should de-
cline the inevitable invitations to find "property damage" coverage under
the standard liability policy for the loss or corruption of computer data.
To do otherwise would be tantamount to reading the word "tangible"
right out of the contract.
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